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Abstract
To promote industrialisation of the backward areas in the
country, growth centres providing infrastructure to enable the states to
attract industries, were set up by the Government of India in 1988.  In
this study, I assess the performance of growth centres, taking into
account the impact of growth centres on firm location. I do not find
growth centres to have a statistically significant effect on unemployment
rate.  However, I find that wherever growth centres exist, they positively
affect the number of firms locating there. Combining quantitative with
qualitative methods, I conclude with implications for firm location and
criteria for growth centre designation.
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Introduction
The debate on convergence has occupied a lot of attention in the
development literature. Convergence implies that in a steady state,
poorer regions/countries can be expected to grow more rapidly than their
richer counterparts. This occurs mainly because of the free flow of capital
to the poorer regions (because of capital shortage, the rate of return to
capital in such regions will be higher). Convergence also occurs because
poorer countries/regions need not reinvent the wheel and can imitate the
technological changes adopted by the richer regions.
The debate on convergence in Indian states is divided on the
issue. But the majority view has been that the disparities between the
poorer and richer states and regions have widened enormously (see
Rao, Shand and Kalirajan, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000; Srivastava, 2001;
Singh and Srinivasan, 2002; Cashin and Sahay, 1996; Rao and Sen
1997; Nagaraj, Varoudakis, and Veganzones (1998)). This somewhat
curious phenomenon is understandable because while the reforms have
positively influenced economic growth and the richer states, the poorer
states have grown quite slowly. As we know, the extent of trickle down of
growth is dependent on the employment elasticity of agricultural output,
which has remained stagnant in India. Further, non-agricultural
employment has not grown rapidly enough to absorb the labour force.
The infrastructure has remained a bottleneck and has hampered the
trickle down of growth and employment opportunity.
Thus, despite planning, regional disparities did not show
reduction over the years. Therefore, the Government of India introduced
the “growth centres” program in June 1988 to give impetus to
industrialisation process in backward regions. According to this
programme, 71 growth centres were set up throughout the country that
were allotted to the various states on the basis of a combined criteria of
area, population, and extent of industrial backwardness. These growth
centres provide basic industrial infrastructure like power, water, telecom,6
and banking to enable the states to attract industries. Central
government funds for the programme were expected to be leveraged by
the states for purposes of financing.
II.  Research Objectives
The objectives of the research are as follows:
• To empirically examine the effect of growth centres on
unemployment rate.
• To empirically study the effect of growth centres where they have
been established, on firm location.
• To qualitatively examine the relative impact of tax incentives and
infrastructure on firm location decisions, based on my visits to firms
located in several growth centres throughout the country.
In addition to the secondary data I obtained from DIPP regarding
the functioning and effectiveness of growth centres, secondary data from
all Indian states (containing growth centres) are obtained to answer the
above questions to evaluate their effectiveness.
In order to answer the first question, I estimate the
unemployment rate. To answer the second question, I estimate the
impact of growth centres as depending on the existence of infrastructure.
II.1.  Importance of Growth Centres
The growth centres programme assumes special importance in
light of a recent decision to stop the war of tax incentives among Indian
states. Various states in India, until recently, had been offering tax
incentives to investors in order to persuade them to locate in their states,
make investments and create employment. Such competition is not
unique to India, but has characterised local economic development
policy in the United States as well (see Sridhar, 1996, for instance).
There are several instances of such competition among the
Indian states in the post-liberalization (1991) period. Karnataka’s Chief
Minister had been attempting to woo the house of Tatas to explore
business opportunities in the state. Madhya Pradesh organised a 3-day
event called as Destination Madhya Pradesh to market the state to
investors, which ended in a promise from various investors (including
foreign) of around (US) $1 billion investments in steel, automobile,7
software, and pharmaceutical sectors in the state. In terms of actual tax
incentives also, there had been several instances of generous
abatements during the past decade in India.
A conference of state chief ministers and the Union Finance
Minister decided in November 1999 to stop this tax war among the Indian
states.
1 The decision was taken because the offer of tax incentives, apart
from affecting the general fiscal health of the states, also affects the
states’ ability to provide infrastructure services, given the fact that sales
tax revenue accounts for nearly one-fourth of own source revenue for
majority Indian states. The growth centre approach is a test of the
alternative to the tax war among the states. It is also a test of the attempt
to increase rural industrialization in the country to enable convergence
among Indian states.
However, there is a lot of scepticism regarding growth centres
and their effectiveness in attracting firms. Views have varied from a
perception of the programme having been a colossal failure in attracting
firms to one that strongly believes in their effectiveness because of the
infrastructure incentives available to firms that locate there. This study
presents empirical evidence of the effectiveness of growth centres,
based on secondary data from the Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of Industry, Government of India, and
secondary, district-level data available from the census of India. Finally, I
also collect and report primary data from my field visits to firms and
growth centres located in various parts of the country.
I perform three exercises in this study: first, econometric
estimation of the unemployment rate, followed by an estimation of
number of firms locating in growth centres where they exist, and finally,
the qualitative results from my visits to firms located in various growth
centres throughout the country.
III.  Review of Literature
There is a vast body of theoretical, empirical, and policy literature
that deals with firm location decisions. A majority of the literature studies
the relative impact of tax incentives and public services on firm location
decisions. The literature argues that if public services were not held
constant, tax incentives are not important in firm location decisions. The
first study on sales tax incentives in the Indian context is by Tulasidhar
and Rao (1986), which shows both employment and output loss due to8
tax incentives, albeit in a partial equilibrium framework. This study
examines sales tax incentives in Madhya Pradesh and places the
revenue loss at as much as 7 to 10 percent of the sales tax revenue.
Their analysis of a large number of medium and large-scale industries
indicated that the sales tax incentive, whichever way it is designed, is not
the most appropriate instrument to raise the level of investment or
spread this to backward areas.
Rajaraman et al (1999), based on data from Madhya Pradesh,
finds that fiscal incentives have a statistically insignificant impact on large
and medium investment in Madhya Pradesh. Conversely, the study finds
that abundant power was an important factor attracting investment into
the state during the eighties, highlighting the importance of infrastructure
in firm location decisions.
Second, the literature goes on to explain that even if tax
incentives were to be effective in firm location decisions, they merely
provide incentives for firms to relocate from one area to another, but do
not result in any new increases in employment (see Netzer 1991; Rubin
and Zorn 1985).
We have to make several observations about the relative
importance of tax incentives and public (primarily infrastructure) services
based on the literature. First, when the level of public (infrastructure)
services is held constant, benefits to firms of tax incentives are quite
significant. Although there are several factors that are more important
than taxes to business location decisions, tax incentives enable
corporate planning for reinvestment.
Bartik (1991), based on his comprehensive survey of the
econometric literature, summarizing studies using data from the United
States, found that the tax elasticity of business activity is in the range of
–1.0 to –3.0 for intrastate business location decisions. This means that,
holding public services constant, if a local government in a state were to
reduce its taxes by 1 percent, in the long run, it could expect to see an
increase in its business activity (investment and employment) anywhere
in the range between 10 to 30 percent. This was found to be higher than
for interstate location decisions (which Bartik found was in the range
from –0.1 to –0.6), which is reasonable to expect, because traditional
factors (such as transport costs, raw material availability, size of, and
proximity to the market) that affect firm location are likely to be different
across states and hence more important in their decisions. Further,
across locations (such as within a state) where traditional factors are
constant, tax incentives are likely to play an important role in influencing
firm location.
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Second, it is not necessary that incentives to industry will always
be harmful to development of infrastructure in the state. A good example
is the Karnataka government’s proposal to replace financial with
infrastructure incentives to the auto industry. Karnataka promised
training institutions, schools, colleges, office complexes, housing, a
globally well-knit telecom network, roads, dedicated power and water
supply necessary for the development of automobile manufacturing units
as well as vendors and dealers in the state. If other states also follow this
example, competition will only work to enhance the infrastructure
competitiveness of the states.
Last but not the least, poorer states/regions are justified in
offering (infrastructure) incentives to attract industry and employment. If
distressed areas, with the provision of incentives, were to be successful
in attracting firms to invest and create employment, greater social net
benefits would accrue to the area. Net benefit from a job is similar to
consumers’ surplus.
3 Net benefit from a job is the extent to which actual
wage is higher than the wage at which a person is willing to accept a job
(which is referred to as a person’s reservation wage). Thus, for example,
if a person is not willing to accept a job below Rs.5,000 a month
(Rs.5,000 is called his/her reservation wage), and s/he were to be
offered a job for Rs.6,000, Rs.1,000 represents his/her net benefit from
the job every month.
If earnings were to be constant across areas,
4 net benefits would
be higher if persons are willing to accept jobs at lower wages. This is not
to say that it is socially beneficial for persons to be willing to accept jobs
at lower wages. But it is easy to imagine that persons in poorer, high
unemployment areas and poorer states, where job opportunities are
difficult to come by, unemployed persons value the importance of having
a job. As Bartik (1991), argues, they are likely to search more rigorously
for job openings, wait longer in line for job interviews and less likely to
quit a job once they obtain one. For these reasons, they would be willing
to accept a job, if it becomes available, at a wage lower than what a
person would be willing to accept in relatively richer, low unemployment
areas. Therefore, if an unemployed person in a high unemployment area
were to be offered a job, net benefits derived from this job would be
higher than that from a similar job in a low unemployment area. Sridhar
(1996) finds evidence of this, based on data from the United States.
However, Haurin and Sridhar (2003), using data from the United States,
find no impact of higher local unemployment rates on individuals’
reservation wages. Nevertheless, as they suggest, it is sensible to attack
clusters of high unemployment with policies that increase the demand for
workers.10
Also, given the fact that in India, since the 1950s, the disparities
between these and the richer, southern and western states have
widened enormously, incentives used to attract employment by
distressed areas can become a tool to increase the net benefits from the
employment generated in these areas, and reduce the disparities
between them and the richer states. Thus incentives could be justified if
they are offered by poorer states, and can be restricted to cases where
they serve some useful economic purpose. In fact, the Finance Minister
recently said that he was willing to allow states in the north-eastern
region to have a separate sales tax structure.
5
Thus we have to think about a war on unemployment and
distress in the country. From this point of view, poorer states could be
justified if they aggressively offer (infrastructure or tax) incentives to
attract investment. This could be justified till at least such time the wide
regional disparities in the distribution of income and employment within
the country narrow. Further, we have to think about stimulating, not
stifling competition, in the provision of infrastructure by all the states.
Such reforms are much needed. From this viewpoint, growth centres are
very important in influencing firm location decisions because they
encourage competition among the states in the provision of infrastructure
which are quite critical to firms.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section describes
the theory and model that form the basis of the work, followed by a
description of the secondary data and presents results from estimations.
I report two estimations: estimation of unemployment rate; estimation to
assess the performance of growth centres where they exist. The final
section summarises the many important policy implications of the
research based on the empirical results and field visits to firms and
growth centres.
IV.  Theory and model
One of the objectives of the research is to examine the impact of
growth centres on unemployment, to enable a better assessment of the
programme.
Basic labour economic theory (see Ehrenberg and Smith, 1993)
shows that the labour market outcomes—unemployment rate (or the
number of people un/employed) and wages (price of labour), are11
simultaneously determined, and are determined by forces of demand for,
and supply of labour. The demand for labour depends on wages,
technology, and capital. The supply of labour depends on wages and
non-wage characteristics such as hours of work, and flexibility.
So we have
QD
L  = f (wages, technology, capital)-----------------------[1]
QS
L  = g (wages, hours of work, flexibility)---------------[2]
We find that the demand and supply equations [1] and [2] are
both over-identified.
6 To estimate unemployment rate (measure of QD
L =
QS
L in equilibrium), we may write the above equations in reduced form.
7
The unemployment rate in reduced form, is a function of wages.
8
Literature (see for instance, Pantuosco and Parker, 1998; Sridhar, 2000)
shows the unemployment rate in reduced form as dependent on wages
that are determined by various socio-demographic characteristics.
This is reasonable for us to believe as the number of those
willing to work depends on the wage rate. For instance, at very high
wages, those working at home or dependents may be willing to work.
I estimate unemployment rate in reduced form as dependent on
socio-demographic characteristics -- characteristics such as average
age, proportion of minorities (in the Indian context, scheduled castes
and/or scheduled tribes), proportion male, and literacy rate -- that
determine wages, using district-level data for India.
Other variables in the reduced form equation for unemployment
rate include
9 technology, capital, hours of work and flexibility (see
equations [1] and [2]). Since the data are for a single country, we do not
expect the level of technology, capital availability to vary significantly
enough for us to include them in the estimation. Further, the nature of
jobs available in the country is such that there is not much variability in
hours of work
10 and flexibility (for instance, most of them tend to be eight
hour jobs, with not much flexibility in timings).
11 Hence I do not include
measures of these variables in the estimation, but include only those that
determine wages, in reduced form.
12
The model estimating the unemployment rate of the ith district
may be summarized as follows:
Ui = Dummy for Growth Centrei + Duration of Growth Centrei + Duration
of Growth Centre Squaredi + Manufacturing employmenti + Service12
employmenti + Proportion SC/STi + Proportion malei + Literacy ratei +
Mean agei  + ei -------------------[3]
As equation [3] shows, in addition to controlling for
characteristics that determine the wage (in reduced form) at the district-
level (based on data for all Indian states), I control for the occupational
composition of areas. This is so because different occupations, as
reflected, for instance, in the proportion of employment in manufacturing
as opposed to service occupations, could have different unemployment
rates due to different demand and supply conditions.
13 These measures
reflect the importance of these sectors in the area’s economic base, and
it is necessary to control for them. I expect the proportion of
manufacturing employment in the area to have some impact, and the
proportion in service employment, negative impact on the unemployment
rate. This is because of the increasing importance of services in the
economic base of the country.
The expectation from theoretical models that have been
developed in the literature (for instance see Ge, (1995) for theoretical
model, Sridhar (2000) for empirical evidence from the state of Ohio in the
United States) is that areas with targeted programmes (such as growth
centres) see a reduction in their unemployment rate. Consistent with this
literature, along with other variables that determine the unemployment
rate, I include a dummy for whether or not growth centre exists in
districts of states that have growth centres.
14 This methodology, while
allowing us to control for all other variables that affect an area’s
unemployment rate, enables us to look at the impact of the growth
centre. This is also consistent with the original objective with which
growth centres were set up to promote industrialization of backward
areas in the country. Note that while in earlier literature (for instance
Sridhar (2000), the program (here, the growth centre) dummy and
unemployment rate, are considered simultaneously determined, here,
that problem does not arise. This is because I have checked the
objective criteria for growth centres specified by the Government of India
(look at the final section on policy implications), and through several
discussions, have confirmed that unemployment rate is not a criterion for
growth centre designation.
In addition to the effect of growth centres on unemployment rate,
I control for the time period (duration, in months, as of December 2001)
15
for which it has been in existence in the area (since the day of
certification). One can imagine that growth centres could reduce the
unemployment rate of an area, but there could be some optimum period
for which it is desirable.
16 To facilitate such an understanding, the13
approach would be to include a variable that indicates for how long the
growth centre has been in existence in each district.  Earlier research
(Sridhar, 2000, with respect to tax incentive programmes) suggests that
3-5 years could be the optimum period for maximizing the effect of
targeted programmes on unemployment rate, after which it is preferable
that the area abates offering (tax or infrastructure) incentives. In terms of
policy action, this translates into decertifying areas that have been
growth centres, beyond a certain period.
In addition to the duration variable, I include in the estimation, its
squared term. This is to check for any non-linearity in the impact of
duration of growth centre on the unemployment rate.
17 For instance, one
may expect that the growth centre would initially be highly effective in
reducing unemployment, but its effect could gradually taper off later,
either because bureaucracies make way into the institutional structure, or
simply that business / governmental interest wanes in the program.
V.  Description of Variables and Data
Data on unemployment rate were not available readily. Data,
however, on population, main, marginal and non-workers are available
by district from the 2001 Census of India. Main workers are those who
had worked for the major part of the year preceding the date of
enumeration.
18 Marginal workers are those who worked for sometime in
the year preceding the enumeration but did not work for a major part of
the year.
19 If an individual had not worked at all during the last year he or
she is treated as a non-worker by the census. Non-workers include (i)
those attending to household duties at home; (ii) students; (iii)
dependents; (iv) retired persons or renters; (v) beggars; (vi) inmates of
institutions; and (vii) other non-workers. To be consistent with census’
definition of non-workers, here, non-workers have been treated as those
outside of the labor force.
 20 Marginal workers have been treated as
those that were willing, but have not found full-time work. The
unemployment rate is thus the ratio of these marginal workers to those in
the labour force (main plus marginal workers).
Other variables are calculated in a straightforward manner from
the 2001 Census of India. Literacy rate is the total number of literates
divided by population older than 6 for each district. The proportion male,
is male population older than 6 years computed as a proportion of
population older than 6 years.14
Census 2001 has not yet published data on population in various
age groups, SC/ST population, and employment by category. For
purposes of calculating average age of population, proportion SC/ST,
and proportion in manufacturing and service occupations, I use the 1991
Census of India. I assume that the proportion of employment in
manufacturing and services, average age of population in the districts
and proportion of SC/ST in the various districts, roughly remained
constant during the decade.
21
The average age is the weighted average of the population in
every age group (the weights) and the ages.
22 The proportion employed
in manufacturing (manufacturing and processing in household industry,
and other than household industry workers) and those in services (this
includes workers in trade and commerce, those in transport, storage and
communications, and in other services) are calculated as proportion of
total workers.
23
Table 1 describes the relevant data for 543 districts in Indian
states containing growth centres for which all data were available, and
that are included in the estimation of unemployment rate.
24
On average, the unemployment rate is around 24 percent,
although there are few districts that have greater than 40 percent
unemployment rate, the maximum unemployment district, with no growth
centre, in the state of Rajasthan, reinforcing the need for some kind of
targeting. For purposes of interest and comparison, I report work force
participation rates. Work force participation rate is the ratio of main plus
marginal workers (total labour force) to total population. On average, the
workforce participation rate is 41 percent, which is lower than that in
advanced countries such as the United States and Australia (where it
was roughly 51 percent each) and New Zealand (where this was roughly
50 percent, based on data for 2001).
It may be noted from Table 1 that districts, on average, have
young population as may be seen in their average age. Since we expect
youth in the mid-thirties to be actively involved in the labour force
(seeking or changing jobs), the growth centre approach is important to
study, for its effects on the unemployment rate and hence the work force
participation of these youth.
25
On average, the literacy rate is 64 percent for districts in states
containing growth centres, which is roughly consistent with data for the
country. The minimum literacy is found in an area that does not have a
growth centre. The maximum literacy area has a growth centre. Roughly,15
on average, a little more than half of population of the districts is male.
On average, about one-third of the population is SC or ST in the districts.
Table 1:  Description of Data used in Estimation of Unemployment Rate
(N=543)
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std.
Deviation
Unemployment rate,
2001 0.24 0.05 0.49 0.09
Work participation
rate, 2001 0.41 0.24 0.64 0.07
Literacy rate, 2001 0.64 0.30 0.97 0.13
Proportion male,
2001 0.52 0.46 0.58 0.02
GC_dummy, 2001 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.33
Duration of GC
(months ), 2001 10.97 0.00 129.00 31.07
Duration squared 1083.76 0.00 16641.00 3417.71
Avg age, 1991 34.06 31.56 36.46 0.77
Proportion




1991 0.08 0.00 0.37 0.06
Proportion
employment,
services,1991 0.19 0.06 0.72 0.10
On average, the proportion dependent on services is much
greater than that dependent on manufacturing that reinforces the service16
economy India has become. Thirteen percent of the districts contain
growth centres. The mean for the growth centre dummy shows this.
Table 2 compares these data for districts with growth centres
and those without them. Surprisingly, there is very little difference across
districts with and without growth centres, except literacy rate and the
proportion employed in services. On average, districts with growth
centres are more literate, and contain more service employment than
those without them. Finally, the proportion of SC/ST is smaller in the
growth centre districts than in their non-growth centre counterparts. Data
on duration of the growth centre (for districts with growth centres only)
show that on average, growth centres have been in place for nearly 87
months (or a little more than 7 years).











2001 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.08
Work participation rate,
2001 0.41 0.07 0.40 0.07
Literacy rate, 2001 0.64 0.13 0.66 0.13
Proportion male, 2001 0.52 0.02 0.51 0.02
Avg. age, 1991 34.06 0.77 34.10 0.79
Proportion SC/ST,
1991 0.31 0.21 0.28 0.19
Proportion
employment,
manufacturing, 1991 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05
Proportion
employment, services,
1991 0.19 0.10 0.21 0.09
Duration of growth
centre (in months) NA NA 87.59 31.58
VI.  Results From Estimation of  Unemployment Rate17
Table 3 shows the results from OLS estimation of unemployment
rate, based on districts in the country for which all data were available.
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First, note the standardised coefficients.  The standardised coefficient for
the duration of growth centre variable is the maximum contributing factor
to explaining changes in unemployment rate.
The estimation shows that the literacy rate, proportion male,
proportion of employment in manufacturing and that in services, are
statistically significant in explaining changes in unemployment rate.
Table 3:  Results from OLS Estimation (N=543)
               Dependent Variable: Unemployment Rate




(Constant) 0.75 0.25 2.95
Literacy rate, 2001 -0.11*** 0.03 -3.24 -0.16
Proportion male, 2001 -0.72*** 0.23 -3.18 -0.14
GC_dummy, 2001 -0.05 0.10 -0.51 -0.19
Duration of GC (years),
2001 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.79
Duration squared 0.00 0.00 -1.01 -0.64
Average age, 1991 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.00
Proportion SC/ST, 1991 0.01 0.02 0.30 0.01
Proportion employment,
mfg,1991 -0.20*** 0.07 -2.91 -0.14
Proportion employment,






***Statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
The coefficient on literacy rate is negative, as we expect. This
shows that higher literacy implies that the area’s workforce is more
marketable and increases their employability. Specifically, for every one
percentage point increase in the literacy rate of district, there is a 0.1118
percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate of the area. The
sign on proportion male is negative as expected, indicating that districts
with higher proportion of men cause areas to have lower unemployment
rate, holding education and other characteristics constant. This is
somewhat reasonable to expect, since men continue to be the primary
income earners in most households, the higher the proportion of men,
higher would be the employment rate (or the lower would be the
unemployment rate).
The proportion of employment, both in manufacturing and
service occupations, have a significant impact on the unemployment
rate, showing that as the proportion dependent on these occupations
increase, unemployment is likely to decrease.
The growth centre dummy does not have a statistically
significant impact in reducing the unemployment rate of districts that
contain them.
27 The lack of significant relationship between growth
centre dummy and unemployment could be a spurious result.  It is
possible that institutional rigidities are far too strong in these backward
regions and any positive effect of the growth centres is not strong
enough to counter the institutional problems.  Alternatively, the impact of
growth centres may not be strong enough to counter the inherent
disadvantages in the regions.
Further, note that the growth centre is in place in only 13 percent
of the districts. Even here, they are completely operational only in some
of the 68 growth centres. For instance, in U.P., although growth centres
are officially in place in 6 of the districts, they are functioning only in two
of them (Gorakhpur and Jaunpur). The other proposed growth centres
have been delayed because of land acquisition and litigation problems
over the compensation to be paid to landowners. Overall, taking into
account all districts, functioning growth centres may be said to have too
small an effect on unemployment rate yet.
Next, based on my field visits, I find that many areas would have
grown the way they have [for instance, Gorakhpur in U.P., (see Figure 1
for a map of the industrial areas of U.P.)  Gorakhpur is an industrial area,
irrespective of its growth centre status; and Hassan in Karnataka], even
without the growth centre. This is because presumably these are areas
with infrastructure already in place (and not necessarily the result of the
growth centre) needed for firms to grow.
FIGURE 1: Industrial Areas of Uttar Pradesh19
Few areas with growth centre (take the instance of Satharia (in
Jaunpur district, U.P.)), however, would not have grown the way they20
have, without the growth centre. Satharia is in a remote location, about
47 kilometres from the Jaunpur district headquarters, (is this ‘close’ to
district headquarters? See criterion II for growth centre designation in
section on policy implications), with road access to Satharia being quite
poor (winding roads in the midst of thick vegetation), which industries
find quite disadvantageous, in terms of transport costs, time and
logistics. It is reasonable to believe that only because of the
establishment of the growth centre and provision of infrastructure (power,
telecom, paved roads) that this area has been able to attract industry.
This discussion implies that designation criteria for growth
centres have to be distress-based, although they should consider
potential for development. I discuss more about designation criteria in
the section on policy implications.
Finally, the result I find could be the outcome of the large area
that a district covers. If we were to obtain data on unemployment rate at
a more disaggregated level, say block-level, and then introduce the
growth centre dummy, it is possible that we may find growth centres to
have some impact on the unemployment rate. For instance, Sridhar
(2000), estimates the unemployment rate at the census block-group level
for the state of Ohio in the United States. Even if the relevant block-level
data would be available, a question that, however, remains is, whether
we can expect unemployment rates to vary substantially across blocks to
enable estimation. In any case, estimating unemployment rate at the
block-level is a potential extension to this work.
The signs on the duration (of growth centre) variable and its
squared are interesting when combined with that for the growth centre
dummy. While the negative sign on the growth centre dummy implies
that areas with growth centres can expect to see a reduction in their
unemployment rate, sign on the duration variable indicates that the
longer the growth centres are in place, the higher would be their
unemployment rate. This outcome points to the need for well-defined,
predetermined sunset provisions of the program when the objectives of
industrialization have been met. This is also consistent with the results in
Sridhar (2000).
I looked at the correlation matrix and no correlations were
alarming enough to suspect collinearity.
28 Further, I performed formal
tests of heteroscedasticity in the data, and found that it was small
enough to be ignored.
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VII.  Estimation for Growth Centres21
In addition to examining the unemployment rate, I assess the
performance of growth centres, based on where they exist in the country.
Secondary data available on the various growth centres from the
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), the Union Ministry
of Commerce, contain information on the date of their approval,
approved project cost, amounts of central and state releases,
30 final total
expenditures, land acquired, number of plots developed and allotted, the
number of firms established, capital invested and employment created by
them.
Table 4 describes this data (obtained from the DIPP) for the 68
growth centres in the country. The Table shows that approximately 38
percent of the total expenditure on growth centre is leveraged by funds
from the Centre, the total expenditure being less than the approved
project cost in all cases, as one would expect. The average size of a plot
on which an industrial unit sits in the various growth centres, is roughly 3
acres, based on the land acquisition and developed plots data in Table 4.
On average, the number of plots allotted to firms (52), significantly lags
behind the number developed (about 198). This implies that the growth
centres still need to market themselves to businesses as good places to
invest.
31 On average, the number of units (firms) established in these
growth centres is even much less, being about 12. This could be due to
the fact that only one-third of the growth centres have firms so far, either
because they are still in the land acquisition/development stage or are in
the process of being allotted to firms. If we take into account just the
growth centres in which firm establishment activity has already taken
place, on average, about 40 firms have been established with a capital
investment of Rs.11,780 lakh on average. The average employment
creation per growth centre (390) shows that mostly labour-intensive firms
have located here.
Table 4: Description of Data for Growth Centres (N=68)




lakhs) 3,444.39 11,184.60 1,500.00 1,421.18
Central Release
(rupees in lakhs) 481.93 1,050.00 50.00 368.27
State release
(rupees in lakhs) 914.02 7,346.91 0.00 1,440.00
Total expenditure
(rupees in lakhs) 1,255.41 8,346.91 0.00 1,713.38
Land acquired (in
acres)* 659.10 3,060.41 0.00 722.92
Plots/sheds
developed 198.47 2,205.00 0.00 384.38
Plots/sheds allotted 51.94 362.00 0.00 91.00
Number of units
established 12.43 231.00 0.00 33.35
Capital invested by
units (rupees in
lakhs) 11,788.75 435,300.00 0.00 54,865.79
Employment 389.87 7,191.00 0.00 1,189.74
Regional Dummy 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.50
Plots/sheds
developed 198.47 2,205.00 0.00 384.38
*Only for this variable the descriptive statistics are based on 63
observations since at the time I got the data, DIPP had not received
reports regarding acquired land from 5 of the states
To assess the impact of growth centres where they exist, I
estimate the number of units (firms) as dependent on the presence of
growth centres. Since growth centres were set up to promote the
industrialisation of backward areas in the country, I use the number of
firms located in the growth centre as measure of their performance. I
estimate the number of firms located in growth centres as dependent on
the number of plots developed and a dummy for the region in which the
growth centre is located.
I confirmed (from growth centre officials) that the number of
developed sheds/plots represents the most important quantitative
indicator of the presence of growth centres. This is reasonable to
assume because developed plots represent what growth centres
promise to industry—infrastructure and public services to enable their
location. The infrastructure typically includes roads, electricity, telephone
lines, and water/sewerage connections. The estimation attempts to
empirically validate if infrastructure (which is what a developed plot
implies) is a determinant of firms’ decision to locate in the area.23
In addition to the presence of growth centres, I develop a
regional dummy for areas where the growth centre is located. This is
because, holding everything constant, casual observation suggests that,
irrespective of tax incentives or public services (which growth centres
provide), firms most likely locate in prosperous areas because of their
presumed favourable business climate. This presumed business climate
could be a composite index consisting of characteristics (such as skills,
work ethic) of the labour force, local area income (indicative of demand
conditions), political factors including law and order conditions, political
leadership, social factors such as communal harmony, and amenities
such as temperate weather conditions, schooling, and recreational
facilities.
In order to make a regional dummy for every growth centre, I
assume that these characteristics are most closely related to income. In
the Indian context, this assumption seems to be tenable. For instance,
some of the higher income states (such as Karnataka, Tamilnadu,
Maharashtra, Punjab, Haryana) are also the ones that are better
governed, have more skilled labour force, and have better infrastructure.
For purposes of making the regional dummy, I compute weighted
rural income (the weights being number of households in every income
group), based on data published by the National Council of Applied
Economic Research, for all states. Whenever this weighted rural income
for the state containing the growth centre, is higher than the all-India
weighted rural income, the growth centre receives a value of 1, implying
that it is in a relatively prosperous area. When the weighted rural income
for the state is below than the national average weighted rural income,
the growth centre receives a value of 0 for the regional dummy. The
average value of the regional dummy  in Table 4 shows that roughly half
of the growth centres are located in relatively prosperous states with
higher rural income (in relation to national average).
Table 5 presents the results from this OLS estimation. The value
of adjusted R
-squared
 indicates that this model explains more than 60
percent of the variation in the number of firms locating in growth centres.
It shows that when controlled for the state in which the growth centre is
located, the number of developed plots is a highly significant determinant
of the decision of firms to locate in the growth centre. This implies that,
among states having growth centres, those having the financial
resources to develop larger number of plots with infrastructure are the
ones that attract firms. These results are consistent with the results from
the qualitative discussions I have had with several growth centre firms
that I visited in various growth centres throughout the country.24
Table 5: Estimation of Growth Centre Performance (N=68)






Intercept -3.38 3.53 -0.96
Regional Dummy 5.13 5.14 1.00




In general, the prosperous states attract greater number of firms
as may be seen in the sign of the coefficient on the regional dummy, but
the effect is not statistically significant.
When combined, the results from estimation of the
unemployment rate and that for the growth centres show that, it is not a
bad idea for states to invest in improving their infrastructure, as that
helps in improving and marketing the area as a better place to do
business. This is valid even if one is not sure about the effectiveness of
growth centres. Growth centre is a name we may give to the targeted
development of infrastructure in distressed pockets of states.
The next section describes my visits to a sample of growth
centres, discussions with state government, industrial agencies
implementing the programme, the firms that have located there, and
summarises policy implications arising out of the work. See Sridhar
(2003), for impact of these firms on local labour markets and their social
contribution to the communities in which they have located.
VIII.  Policy Implications25
To corroborate empirical findings of the work, I visited 4 growth
centres through the country -- one in the south (Hassan, Karnataka), one
in the north – Bawal, Haryana, and both the growth centres in U.P. that
are functioning and where firms have located. The location of these
growth centres is geographically dispersed enough to give a fair picture
of their functioning and evaluation.
In this section, I summarise the qualitative findings from my visits
to these growth centres. I elaborate on firm-level and growth-centre
implications.
Table 6 gives an overview of some aspects of the growth centres
I visited and summarises primary data I collected regarding number of
plots developed and allotted, average size of plot in the growth centre
and compensation the government had to pay to acquire the land for
growth centre uses.
32 The cost of land in U.P. is higher because of its
fertile nature. Land acquisition in U.P. appeared to be more prone to
litigation, compared with the other states where compensation for land
was negotiated between the government and landowners.











Bawal, Haryana 561 (208) Ranges from
0.06 of an acre
to 10 acres
Rs.2-4 lakh per acre
Hassan, Karnataka 213 (65)* 7.8 acres Rs.3.5 lakh per acre
Shajanwa, U.P. 290 (265) Ranges from
0.06 of an acre
to 3 acres
Rs.3.5 lakh per acre
Satharia, U.P. 462 (337) Ranges from 0.1
of an acre to 7
acres, average
plot size being
0.07 of an acre
Rs.2-6 lakh per acre
*In Hassan growth centre, 1,662 acres have been developed out
of which 514 acres (31 percent of developed area) have been allotted so
far. Based on the average size of 7.8 acres per plot, I surmise that 213
plots are developed out of which 65 plots have been allotted.
First, I summarise the attractiveness of growth centre
infrastructure to firms, whether/not tax incentives were effective in their
location decisions, the importance of traditional factors (such as
availability of raw material, transport costs, proximity to markets and26
availability of skilled labour force). Sridhar (2003) finds that these firms
have favourable impacts on the local labour markets where they have
located. That study also finds that few of these firms export and some of
them contribute socially to the communities in which they have located.
I have studied here at the firm-level whether or not other
locations were considered by the firms and whether they really represent
local entrepreneurship that could have occured anyway. This is quite
critical for us to understand if we have to qualitatively evaluate the impact
of tax incentives. Nevertheless, note that in the Indian context, studies
(Rajaraman et al 1999) have shown that infrastructure are more
important than fiscal incentives in medium and large industry investment
decisions.
Table 7 summarises the effectiveness of growth centre
infrastructure and of tax incentives in firm location decisions, based on
firm responses where I visited. In all, I visited 18 firms in the four growth
centres.  Everywhere, I made a conscious effort to study firms that
located after the growth centre came into existence and those that
located before, to isolate factors that influenced their location.27
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Firm-Level Implications: Pre-Growth Centre Firms. We may note from
Table 7 that 5 (27 percent) of these 18 firms are pre-growth centre, that
quite obviously, located without the growth centre. As we expect, growth
centre infrastructure did not appear important to these pre-growth centre
firms. Firms, however, that were grandfathered into the growth centre
(e.g., few firms in Satharia, U.P.) once it came into being, were receiving
the benefits of growth centre infrastructure (e.g., uninterrupted power for
their manufacturing processes which were not available to them earlier).
Of the 5 pre-growth centre firms, majority (4) of them, however,
expressed the view that tax incentives were effective in their location
decision.
33 We also may observe from the table that of the 5 pre-growth
centre firms, 2 were multinational firms whose decisions were not
determined by the growth centre, and two others represent local30
entrepreneurship that would have located there anyway. The other firm
located because of proximity to raw material and availability of tax
incentives at the time. These responses are consistent with what we
would expect of non-growth centre firms.
`
Growth Centre Firms: It is instructive to note from table 7 that while tax
incentives were effective for nearly all pre-GC firms (except one), for only
half of the growth centre firms, tax incentives were effective. These
growth centre firms located where they did because of traditional factors
such as agglomeration economies and proximity to raw material sites
and markets. Further, more than one-third (35 percent) of growth centre
firms represent local entrepreneurship and would have located there
even without the growth centre.
Does this mean that we should discontinue growth centres, and
these areas would experience industrial development anyway? Although
several of these firms represent local entrepreneurship, they find the
growth centre infrastructure and/or tax incentives that were being offered
at the time of their location,
34 to be effective in influencing their
entrepreneurship. With the growth centre, and the guarantee of
infrastructure provision, their entrepreneurship decision occured sooner
rather than later.
It is important to observe from table 7 that growth centre
infrastructure is effective for all the 14 firms that located in the growth
centre after it came into being, and played an important role in their
decision to locate there. Given that most of these are manufacturing
firms, availability of uninterrupted power is quite critical to their
production processes.
The firms’ responses show that the states and their industrial
development authorities have to aggressively promote their backward
areas by providing infrastructure including road/highway access, power
supply, telecom and Internet infrastructure, which would not be available
to firms otherwise. The costs of infrastructure in the major cities of the
country make it difficult for Indian companies to win the price war. There
are several implications for industry and policy that are faced with the
transition that occurs as a city grows.
The first is for industry to relocate to smaller and medium towns,
as the growth centres programme rightly emphasises. If state and local
governments invest in improving the physical infrastructure in small and
medium towns, it is possible that they can compete as alternative
locations, cutting down on operational costs (e.g., rental/leasing costs)31
for firms that would find such costs to be much higher in metro and urban
areas.
In smaller and medium-sized towns, where the growth centres
are located, firms will also be able to get adequately trained labour force
at relatively low cost. This is because the cost-of-living adjusted wage is
itself lower in smaller and medium towns, holding quality constant.
Industries can exploit this advantage.
The other reason for industry to locate to semi-urban and rural
areas (the emphasis of the growth centre programme) is that it would
change their economic base. Urban theory shows that rural-urban
migration occurs in search of employment. Data compiled by the
National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA) show that more than half of
men that migrated from rural to the urban areas of India in 1991 did so
for the sake of employment. Relocation of industry to rural and semi-
urban areas would help the rural poor and surplus labour find alternative
employment in their own areas. This acts as a check on urban migration
that causes critical shortages in urban housing and prevents the creation
of slums. Besides, relocation of industry would also help to coordinate
the government’s poverty alleviation programmes in a better manner. So
far, it has been found that recipients of various employment training
programmes have not been able to find suitable employment in rural
areas.
Finally, the development of smaller and medium towns might
imply that they are self-contained communities, but eventually
automotive ties have to develop between urban areas and their satellite
towns. This implies that development of roads and highways that has
been neglected for a long time in India, gets the attention it needs.
Growth Centre-level Implications: Criteria for Designation of Growth
Centres. Currently criteria for selection of growth centres are as follows
(these criteria are described in circular No.14/23/88-DBA I issued by the
Ministry of Industry, Government of India, dated December 8, 1988):
I. Growth centres shall not be located:
• Within 50 kilometres of the boundary of 7 cities in the country with a
population above 25 lakhs;
• Within 30 kilometres of the 2 cities with a population between 15-25
lakhs; and
• Within 15 kilometres from the boundary of the 12 cities in the country
with a population between 7.5-15 lakhs.32
II. The growth centres should be located close to district/sub-
divisional/block/taluk head quarters or developing urban centres.
III. Growth centres shall have access to basic facilities  -- proximity to
railheads, national or state highways, water supply, power,
telecommunications, and educational and health facilities. If such
facilities are not readily available, it should be ensured that they are
developed with priority and commitment.
Based on my field visits to the growth centres and discussions
with agencies involved in implementation of the programme, in reality,
growth centres are designated by the centre based on a variety of criteria
none of which are clear to neither the states, nor the industrial authorities
implementing the programme. While official criteria for the establishment
of growth centres relate to lack of urbanisation and/or presence of
infrastructure, it is quite possible for many undeserving areas to get
growth centre status. This is because if an area is located at a distance
from an urban area as specified by the policy, it can either have the
infrastructure or not have it, but in both cases it could get designated as
growth centres (for e.g., note criterion III above), according to existing
criteria. There can be several problems with existing criteria:
The first problem would be that undeserving areas or those that
could attract industries without growth centres would be given sops at
the cost of the state and central exchequer.
Second, lack of clear criteria make the designation process arbitrary,
as it has happened in the case of many states in India.
Additional criteria that should be taken into account for designation of
growth centres, to industrialise backward areas and to alleviate
unemployment are:
1. High unemployment: This can be measured by the degree of
unemployment in the state relative to the national average
unemployment. For instance, states having 125% of the nation’s average
unemployment, during the most recent 12 months, could be decided as
high unemployment areas; I have elaborated on the theoretical
arguments as to why we may expect high unemployment areas to be
more deserving than others to attract industry and create employment.
For purposes of designation, first, states with high
unemployment rates in relation to the national average can be identified.
The selected states can be asked to identify their worst unemployment33
areas and backward industrial areas. This can encourage states to
undertake mapping of the spatial distribution of unemployment and
industries, and are feasible to be used as criteria for designation of
growth centres.
2. Industrial backwardness: The prevalence of closed industrial
facilities (probably minimum of 5% of existing units) can be said to
indicate the extent of industrial backwardness of the area.
Enterprise zones in the United States are similar to the growth
centres of India that are a topic of hot debate in the literature and policy
circles because of the alleged ‘pirating’ of firms in one zone by
neighbouring zones. Because of the proliferation of enterprise zones in
some states in the United States, firms save millions of dollars by just
moving across state borders.
However, firm relocation is less likely to be a problem in India
where firms are not footloose. I have confirmed this based on
discussions with firms that have located in various growth centres and
also by informal discussions I have had with employees in the
Department of Company Affairs. This is because when a firm locates in
an area and has access to markets and various distribution networks, it
is less likely to move out just because tax incentives are not available
any more. In fact, the uniform stoppage of tax incentives by all states
throughout the country is likely to check the relocation, even if it exists.
However, this is not so in the United States where most of the areas
have equal access to good transportation facilities and other
infrastructure.
IX.  Concluding Remarks
Thus, over a period of time, growth centres are likely to enjoy all
the benefits of development by catching up with the other areas. When
this is attained and the area’s distress criteria indicate that it is no longer
a high unemployment or industrially backward area, its growth centre
status can be revoked. Thus the time limit for which the areas would be
designated as growth centres is important to be specified. In the absence
of a time limit, areas and industries could respectively lobby for
continuation of the status and incentives forever, not different from small
scale industries in the country that have been protected for over three
decades now.34
The implications of this work for geographically targeted
programs that aim at convergence are for a time-bound programme
which will sunset at the expiry of the period and is performance-based
during the period that it is existent. It is performance-based both for the
state/local government administering the programme and the firms that
make the commitments.35
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NOTES
                                                  
1 This is noteworthy in view of the fact that even states in the United
States of America have not taken this bold step of stopping the incentive
war, although even there, a number of economists and those in the
policy circles continue to be worried about the effect of tax incentives on
the fiscal health of states and their ability to provide public services.
2 These elasticities are for the U.S. and, in general, depend upon the
degree to which alternative locations considered are good substitutes.
So they could differ from country to country depending upon the degree
to which different alternative locations are similar or not from the
viewpoint of prospective businesses.
3 Consumers’ surplus is the savings a consumer realises in the market
when the actual price of a good s/he purchases is lower than what s/he
is actually willing to pay.
4 This is reasonable to assume for the following reasons:
• Wages (adjusted for occupation) across areas are usually cost-of-
living adjusted.
• Although rural-urban wage differentials exist, in the long run, they are
equalised because of migration, as in Todaro’s model.
5 However, now, given that the implementation of value added tax is
impending in all the states, this may not be possible.
6 By the order condition, there are two variables (hours of work, measure
of flexibility in the job) that are excluded from the demand equation
(included in the model), whereas there are two endogenous variables
(wages and the quantity of labour demanded). Since the number of
excluded exogenous variables in the demand equation is greater than
the number of endogenous variables less one, it is over-identified. There
are two exogenous variables excluded in the supply equation (included
in the model – technology and capital) as well, and the number of
endogenous variables is two. So by the order condition again, the supply
equation is over-identified.
7 I have checked, through substitution of terms, the final reduced form
equation for unemployment rate. Note that there is no need to estimate
wages from viewpoint of the research objectives in this paper. Also note
that when I derive the reduced form equations, I assume linearity. This is38
                                                                                                                 
based on assumption in the past literature on the subject (Pantuosco and
Parker 1998; Sridhar 2000).
8 Note that unemployment is fundamentally a disequilibrium
phenomenon. At this point, it is not clear if a model is estimated in
reduced form only when market clearing occurs (as when demand for
and supply of labour meet). It is possible that special techniques are
used in the labour literature, for estimating a disequilibrium model such
as the one with unemployment. I am thankful to Indira Rajaraman for
pointing to this. That is a potential extension to this work.
9 I have checked this through substitution.
10 It is only very recently that the concept of part-time work is slowly
gaining acceptance in India, as revealed by opinion polls.
11 Telecommuting is even more rarely practised. For some preliminary
evidence on telecommuting and flexible work patterns in India, see Mitter
(2000), Irani et al (2000).
12 Note that two-stage least squares (2SLS) is always the recommended
procedure for estimating over-identified equations. If we were to use
indirect least squares to estimate such equations, remember that we will
not get unique values of structural coefficients based on reduced form
equations.
Note that all we need to estimate is the unemployment rate. So I
confine myself to the first step of 2SLS here (which is basically OLS in
both the steps) in which I estimate the unemployment rate in reduced
form, without continuing with the second stage (in which the wage would
have been estimated as a function of the predicted value of the
unemployment rate).
13 We may note here that while the proportion of employment in
manufacturing and services determine the unemployment rate of an
area, there is no reverse causation from unemployment rate to the
proportion in manufacturing and service occupations. We would expect
the manufacturing and service base to be determined by exogenous
factors such as natural resources available, skills of the population, and
the extent of integration into international markets.
14 I have excluded from the estimation, districts in states that do not have
even a single growth centre because these states could be
systematically different from the rest of the sample. See endnote 22.39
                                                                                                                 
15 The growth centre dummy is defined according to its status in 2001.
To be consistent, I have defined the duration variable as of December
2001. Also, note that whether or not a growth centre is completely
operational on the day it is certified or designated is not relevant, it is
only the idea of marketing the area as a good place to do business, if not
the actual incentives, that could make a difference to prospective firms.
This idea supports the construction of the duration of growth centre
variable since the day of its certification.
16 Incidentally, when I visited the Shajanwa growth centre, this issue was
also raised by Gorakhpur Industrial Development Authority (GIDA)
officials (that administers the growth centre) in their observations about
its effectiveness.
17 Remember that the effect of growth centre, its duration and its
squared, on the unemployment rate, over a period of 12 months (or one
year), for instance, can be computed from their coefficients as follows:
Coefficient on growth centre dummy + (Coefficient on duration of growth
centre * 12) + Coefficient on duration squared * 12
2). If we wanted to
know the effect of the growth centre over a period of 2 years, we
substitute 24 (months) instead of 12 as above, and so forth. See Sridhar
(2000).
18 These workers are those who were engaged in any economically
productive activity for 183 days or six months or more during the year.
19 These workers include those who worked for less than 183 days or six
months during the year.
20 This becomes tricky.  If we agree that willingness to work itself
depends on the wage rate, we have to accept that at very high wages,
even working at home or dependents may be willing to work! So if wages
were to be high, taking into account only main workers at any given point
in time could be an under-estimation of those in the labor force. I am
thankful to M.Govinda Rao for pointing to this.
21 During the decade, several new districts were created, mostly carved
out of existing districts. There were also three new states (Jharkhand
carved out of Bihar, Chattisgarh carved out of Madhya Pradesh, and
Uttaranchal out of Uttar Pradesh) created during the decade. For new
districts and those in these new states, I have assumed that the data for
the parent district (from which it was carved) holds good. Given the fact40
                                                                                                                 
that these districts and those in the state have been carved only
relatively recently, the assumption is certainly reasonable to make.
22 I have calculated weighted average age after excluding persons below
15 and above 65, since we are concerned about the effect on the
unemployment rate, of average age of only those eligible to be in the
workforce.
23 Data on workers in manufacturing and services in the 1991 Census of
India were broken down by rural and urban and male and female, so I
aggregated these categories for obtaining total employment in the
respective category.
24 In all, these 543 districts are in 27 (out of 35) Indian states/union
territories that contain growth centres. I did not include in the estimation,
states/union territories that do not contain growth centres, (these being
Chandigarh, Uttaranchal, Delhi, Sikkim, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar
Haveli, Lakshadweep, Andaman & Nicobar Islands), districts in these
states could systematically be different from their counterparts in states
containing growth centres. The objective is to compare only districts that
are equally likely to contain a growth centre, which would not be met if
(districts in) states with not a single growth centre were to be included.
Only one state (Jammu and Kashmir) with growth centres has
been left out of the estimation because of lack of 1991 data for districts in
the state. The 1991 census was not held in Jammu and Kashmir due to
the perturbed law and order situation in the state at the time. The census
of 2001 was not held in Kutch district, Gujarat, because of the
earthquake. These and few other districts in various states have been
left out of the estimation, due to lack of complete data for all variables.
The final estimation is based on a sample of 543 districts for which all
data were available.
25 It is to be noted that the maximum of the average age in the districts is
36 years. This does not mean that there are no persons in any of the
districts that are above this age, but only that this is the maximum of the
weighted average age that has been calculated for all the districts, based
on information regarding number of people in each of the age groups
(the weights) in the districts.
26 OLS is applied to the reduced form equation, this provides consistent
estimates of the parameters.41
                                                                                                                 
27 Although my interest is to explain only variables that are statistically
significant, I probe into the statistically insignificant growth centre
variable to explain it, as that is one of the primary objectives of the study.
28 The correlation matrix is available upon request.
29 I used White’s general test of heteroscedasticity to check for possibility
of non-constant variance of error term with all independent variables. I
had to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. To detect
specifically which exogenous variables were associated with the
problem, I did a graphical plot of residuals against each of the variables. I
found proportion of SC/ST population, proportion of manufacturing
employment and those in services, to be causing increasing error
variance, as in the assumption E (ui
2=s
2Xi). I transformed all variables
using
rvices oportionSe g nufacturin oportionMa ST oportionSC Pr * Pr * Pr
1
as the weight, and performed GLS estimation of the transformed
variables in the original model. I examined the ratio of the OLS variance
to GLS variance, to examine how big of a problem heteroscedasticity is.
The largest OLS error variance (of the proportion male variable) was only
2 times that of the GLS variance, leading me to conclude that the
problem was small enough to be ignored.
30 Currently, the programme is financed by funds from the centre
leveraged by funding at the state-level. There was a proposal to transfer
the programme entirely to the states last year, but it is now not clear
whether the programme is being scrapped (to downsize the
government), or being transferred to the states, or will be continued in its
present form.
31 The Bawal (Rewari) growth centre in Haryana recently advertised itself
in the Economic Times, a leading business newspaper, that it is the best
global destination for businesses to invest!
32 In some cases, there are discrepancies between the secondary data (I
obtained from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion,
Government of India) and the primary data pertaining to the number of
plots developed and allotted to firms. On other aspects reported in Table
6, such as size of plot and cost of land (compensation per acre),
secondary data are not published by DIPP, Government of India, hence42
                                                                                                                 
what is reported based on primary data collected, is the only information
available.
33 In the pre-growth centre (pre-93) period, tax incentives were being
offered by various states.
34 As discussed at the beginning, a decision has been taken by all Indian
states not to offer tax incentives any more. So firms’ responses regarding
tax incentives are not relevant any more.